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Abstract 1 
The present paper examined relationships between schizotypy (measured by the Oxford-2 
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experience; O-LIFE scale brief), belief in the paranormal 3 
(assessed via the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale; RPBS) and proneness to statistical bias (i.e., 4 
perception of randomness and susceptibility to conjunction fallacy). Participants were 254 5 
volunteers recruited via convenience sampling. Probabilistic reasoning problems appeared 6 
framed within both standard and paranormal contexts. Analysis revealed positive correlations 7 
between the Unusual Experience subscale of O-LIFE and paranormal belief measures (RPBS 8 
full scale, traditional paranormal beliefs and new age philosophy). Performance on standard 9 
problems correlated negatively with Unusual Experience and belief in the paranormal 10 
(particularly the traditional paranormal belief dimension of the RPBS). Consideration of 11 
specific problem types revealed that perception of randomness associated more strongly with 12 
belief in the paranormal than conjunction; both problem types related similarly to Unusual 13 
Experience. Structural equation modelling specified that belief in the paranormal mediated the 14 
indirect relationship between Unusual Experience and statistical bias. For problems presented 15 
in a paranormal context a framing effect occurred. Whilst Unusual Experience correlated 16 
positively with conjunction proneness (controlling for perception of randomness), there was no 17 
association between Unusual Experience and perception of randomness (controlling for 18 
conjunction). 19 
 20 
 21 
  22 
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Introduction 23 
Heuristics are simple mental rules or shortcuts, which ease cognitive load and facilitate rapid 24 
formation of judgments and decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). While heuristics typical 25 
yield reasonable judgements, they can also produce systematic deviations from logic and 26 
probability (Costello and Mathison, 2014). Recent research indicates that belief in the 27 
paranormal is associated with susceptibility to heuristic bias, particularly misrepresentation of 28 
chance (Dagnall, Munley, and Parker, 2007, Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, and Rowley, 2014, 29 
Dagnall, Drinkwater, Denovan, Parker, and Rowley, 2016) and conjunction fallacy (Rogers, 30 
Davis, and Fisk, 2009, Rogers, Fisk, and Wiltshire, 2011, Rogers, Frisk, and Lowrie, 2016). 31 
The present paper examined the degree to which level of schizotypy influenced this 32 
relationship. This was a logical extension to previous research because schizotypy correlates 33 
with belief in the paranormal and is associated with proneness to reasoning and cognitive bias. 34 
For instance, jumping to conclusions (Sellen, Oaksford, and Gray, 2005) and tendency to 35 
discount disconfirmatory evidence (Buchy, Woodward, and Liotto, 2006).  36 
Schizotypy is a rich and complex psychopathology concept (Lenzenweger, 2015). 37 
Researchers use schizotypy as a tool for investigating schizophrenia and psychosis associated 38 
phenomena because schizotypy measures assess non-clinical populations and thus avoid 39 
confounds associated with schizophrenic patients (i.e., symptom severity and general decline 40 
in cognitive performance) (Claridge, 1988, Yoon, Kang, and Kwon, 2008). The relationship 41 
between schizotypy and schizophrenia, however, is not a simple one. Different views exist on 42 
the continuum between schizotypy, mental health and mental illness (i.e., quasi-dimensional, 43 
dimensional and fully dimensional). The present paper restricts itself to the notion that 44 
schizotypy is a personality trait (Claridge and Beech, 1995) assessed on a continuum, ranging 45 
from relative psychological health to schizophrenia (psychosis) (Barrantes-Vidal, Grant, and 46 
Kwapil, 2015). This perspective compliments the observations that schizotypy presents within 47 
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the general population and does not necessarily result in psychopathology. Indeed, non-clinical 48 
community respondents can obtain high schizotypy scores without exhibiting schizophrenia 49 
spectrum symptoms (Dembińska-Krajewska and Rybakowski, 2014).  50 
 The inclusion of schizotypy is a logical extension to previous work for several reasons. 51 
Firstly, there is a well-documented positive correlation between schizotypy and belief in the 52 
paranormal (Hergovich, Schott, and Arendasy, 2008). Hergovich et al. (2008) found that 53 
schizotypy predicted key facets of belief in the paranormal (i.e., precognition, psi, witchcraft 54 
and spiritualism). This association arises in part from construct overlap. One of the Schizotypal 55 
Personality Disorder diagnostic criteria refers specifically to odd beliefs or magical thinking 56 
(Hergovich et al., 2008). This relationship suggests that schizotypy may also influence 57 
correlates of paranormal belief. Secondly, the directional nature of the correlation between 58 
schizotypy and paranormal belief is uncertain. Specifically, it is unclear whether belief in the 59 
paranormal produces high schizotypy scores, schizotypy promotes paranormal beliefs 60 
(Hergovich et al., 2008), or the relationship is explained by a common third variable.  61 
The association is complicated further because schizotypy and belief in the paranormal 62 
interact differently with related beliefs. For example, paranormal belief (vs. level of 63 
schizotypy) better predicts traditional religious contents, superstitious thoughts and belief in 64 
the existence of extraordinary life forms (Hergovich et al., 2008). 65 
Finally, previous work indicates that belief in the paranormal and schizotypy influence 66 
perception of causal relationships. Principally, perception of illusory causality and proneness 67 
to connectedness (the tendency to perceive co-occurring events as meaningfully associated). 68 
Perception of randomness in turn is likely to affect appreciation of chance (randomness) and 69 
susceptibility to heuristical bias. Thus, the present study tested the previously unassessed 70 
assertion that schizotypy effects susceptibility to heuristic bias. 71 
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Paranormal belief is moderately associated with probability misjudgement (Blackmore 72 
and Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Dagnall et al., 2014; Dagnall et al., 2007). A seminal 73 
example is Blackmore and Troscianko (1985), who reported that believers in psi (vs. non-74 
believers) performed less well on probability judgment tasks. Psi refers to the unknown factor 75 
in extrasensory perception and psychokinesis experiences. Subsequent research produced 76 
similar findings, but focused on a limited number of reasoning problem types. Observing this, 77 
Dagnall et al. (2007) conducted a study including a range of problem-solving tasks. Items 78 
evaluated four key reasoning domains: perception of randomness (judging the likelihood of 79 
obtaining strings/sequences), base rate (probability of a stated outcome in relation to presented 80 
information), conjunction fallacy (determining whether co-occurring events were more likely 81 
to occur than single, constituent events) and derivation of expected value (evaluating odds in 82 
order to maximise pay-outs). Performance on perception of randomness tasks emerged as the 83 
best predictor of level of paranormal belief. This finding supported the notion that believers in 84 
the paranormal possess a tendency to perceive random events (coincidences) as causally related 85 
(meaningful) (Brugger and Taylor, 2003). 86 
Relatedly, Rogers (Rogers et al., 2009, Rogers et al., 2011) reported a positive 87 
correlation between susceptibility to conjunction fallacy and belief in the paranormal. 88 
Conjunction fallacy refers to instances where event co-occurrence [P(A&B)] (conjunction), is 89 
rated more likely than constituent events, P(A) or P(B) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). The 90 
work of Rogers is important because few previous studies considered the role conjunction plays 91 
in the development and maintenance of paranormal beliefs. 92 
Using a specially designed Scenario Judgements Questionnaire (SJQ), (Rogers et al., 93 
2009) found that paranormal believers (vs. non-believers) made more conjunction errors and 94 
that context effected susceptibility to conjunction; standard problems produced more errors 95 
than those presented in a paranormal framework (Rogers et al., 2009). The SJQ is a measure 96 
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comprised of 16 conjunction vignettes divided into non-paranormal/conventional (e.g., 97 
queuing for airport coffee) and paranormal (e.g., alleged precognition) events. Rogers et al. 98 
(2011) reproduce the finding that believers (vs. non-believers) produced more conjunction 99 
errors, but failed to replicate the outcome that performance varied as a function of problem 100 
type (conventional vs. paranormal).  101 
Conjunction effects are typical weak and significant outcomes reported inconsistently 102 
across the literature. Noting this, Dagnall et al. (2014) investigated further the degree to which 103 
specific probabilistic biases (perception of randomness, base rate, conjunction fallacy and 104 
probability) were associated with belief in the paranormal and proneness to reality testing 105 
deficits (Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality Testing; Lenzenweger, Clarkin, 106 
Kernberg, and Foelsch, 2001). To ensure results were not an artefact of the paranormal scale 107 
used the study employed a range of measures (Manchester Metropolitan University-New, 108 
MMU-N, Dagnall, Parker, Munley, and Drinkwater, 2010a, 2010b; Revised Paranormal Belief 109 
Scale, RPBS, Tobacyk, 2004, Tobacyk and Milford, 1983; and Australian Sheep–Goat Scale., 110 
ASGS, Thalbourne and Delin, 1993).   111 
Multiple regression revealed the best predictor of belief in the paranormal and 112 
proneness to reality testing (RT) deficits was perception of randomness. Performance on 113 
conventional conjunctions correlated only with the Tradition Paranormal Beliefs (TPB) 114 
dimension of the RPBS. Paranormal conjunctions correlated with both paranormal belief and 115 
proneness to RT deficits. Overall findings indicated that conjunction was not strongly 116 
associated with belief in the paranormal.  117 
Considering these findings, Rogers (2014) in the context of general paranormal belief 118 
concluded that conjunction represents a particular instance of misrepresentation of chance (see 119 
Dagnall et al., 2016). This notion is consistent with the small reported effect sizes and the 120 
observation that conjunction adds no/little unique variance to regression models including 121 
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perception of randomness (Dagnall et al., 2014). Cumulatively, results suggest that 122 
susceptibility to conjunction indirectly indexes perception of randomness. Findings agree with 123 
Bressan’s (2002) general proposition that believers in the paranormal possess a lower 124 
subjective chance threshold, which inclines them to perceive unrelated events as causally 125 
related.  126 
Schizotypy also influences perceptions of causality and connectedness. Specifically, 127 
illusory causation is associated with symptoms related to positive schizotypy, principally 128 
magical ideation (Rominger, Weiss, Fink, Schulter, and Papousek, 2011). Within high 129 
schizotypes this manifests as a tendency to see meaning within random patterns (Farias, 130 
Claridge, and Lalljee, 2005; Gianotti, Mohr, Pizzagalli, Lehmann, and Brugger 2001). A 131 
specific example is the propensity to view coincidences as causally related (Diaconis and 132 
Mosteller, 1989). More generally, susceptibility to illusory causality correlates with scores on 133 
cognitive-perceptual measures, such as delusional ideation (Bressan, 2002). In the context of 134 
belief in the paranormal, illusory causation may manifest as the tendency to perceive random 135 
events as causally related. 136 
The relationship between schizotypy and illusory causation, however, is not a simple 137 
one (Fyfe, Williams, Mason, and Pickup, 2008). Fyfe et al. (2008) examined the association 138 
between schizotypy and propensity to see connections between unrelated stimuli or events 139 
(apophenia) and found a positive association on only one of a series of tasks (triangles). 140 
Schizotypy failed to correlate significantly with performance on animated contingency and 141 
stories tasks. Consequently, Fyfe et al. (2008) concluded that within healthy individuals, the 142 
tendency to perceive connectedness represents a weak effect, apparent only under certain 143 
conditions (i.e., situations where high ambiguity exists).  144 
Rominger et al. (2011) explains illusory causation in terms of loose cognitive control. 145 
Specifically, broader or less rigid associative networks and weaker inhibition of irrelevant 146 
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memory content. Poorer appreciation of chance may also be associated with allusive thinking 147 
or looseness of associations (Rominger et al., 2011). Studies report individuals high in positive 148 
schizotypal symptoms (vs. low) perceive more meaning within random patterns and generate 149 
a higher number of unusual words (Gianotti et al., 2001; Farias et al., 2005). In addition, 150 
individuals high in delusional ideation seek less information prior to reaching a decision. This 151 
expresses as the inclination to jump to conclusions, where hypotheses related to decision-152 
making process are accepted or rejected prematurely. 153 
Within delusional individuals, the propensity to make inaccurate judgments based on 154 
insufficient information may contribute to delusion formation and maintenance (Garety and 155 
Freeman, 1999). Collectively, studies indicate that schizotypy is associated with inappropriate 156 
attribution of causation and misperception of randomness (factors linked also with belief in the 157 
paranormal). 158 
 Whilst belief in the paranormal and schizotypy are both associated with misperception 159 
of chance and illusory causation, their relative contribution to heuristic bias requires exposition. 160 
A useful starting point is the work of Williams and Irwin (1991), who delineated paranormal 161 
belief systems as a rational (if deviant) attempt to achieve a metacognitive understanding of 162 
the world, is useful. Williams and Irwin (1991) proposed that belief in the paranormal 163 
represents believers’ subjective efforts to structure the world in terms of magical notions of 164 
causation. Paranormal beliefs act as a framework for structuring odd beliefs and/or magical 165 
thinking (schizotypal related cognitions). Believers perform poorly on tasks related to 166 
perception of randomness because they engage in a sophisticated form of internal reasoning 167 
founded on magical ideation. This represents an individual worldview based upon a subjective 168 
preferential thinking style, rather than a defective understanding of probability.  169 
This rational view contrasts with the conventional interpretation, which attributes 170 
endorsement of paranormal beliefs within schizotypes to impaired psychological functioning 171 
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(cognitive, perceptual and affective distortions); full-blown schizophrenic symptoms 172 
encompass the tendency to embrace paranormal attributions alongside a lack of self-awareness. 173 
Within sub-clinical populations, explanations based upon thinking style preference are more 174 
apposite, given the prosaic nature of paranormal beliefs. 175 
 176 
The Present Study 177 
This paper tested a series of predictions examining relationships between schizotypy, belief in 178 
the paranormal and statistical bias. Hypotheses considered the dimensional structural of 179 
schizotypy and the factorial composition of paranormal belief in order to assess which sub-180 
measures were most strongly associated with general and specific (misrepresentation of chance 181 
and conjunction fallacy) propensity to probabilistic reasoning bias. Particularly, the study 182 
examined the degree to which belief in the paranormal mediated the relationship between 183 
schizotypy and statistical bias.  184 
 The O-LIFE assessed level of schizotypy. The O-LIFE developed from work on the 185 
personality approach to measuring schizotypy, whilst other scales, such as the Schizotypal 186 
Personality Questionnaire-Brief (Raine and Benishay, 1995), derive from clinical work based 187 
on clinical measurement tools. For this reason and because the target sample was normal 188 
healthy individuals the O-LIFE was considered most appropriate (Mason, 2015). 189 
 190 
Schizotypy and belief in the paranormal 191 
Acknowledging preceding work, the researchers hypothesised that the Unusual 192 
Experiences (UnExp) dimension of the O-LIFE scale would best predict belief in the 193 
paranormal. The UnExp subscale assesses positive symptoms of psychosis and contains items 194 
measuring susceptibility to perceptual aberrations, magical thinking and hallucinations. 195 
Prevalence of these characteristics is likely to foster cognitions/perceptions conducive to the 196 
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formation of paranormal beliefs (i.e., proneness to experiencing strange perceptual and 197 
cognitive sensations and/or magical interpretations of occurring events) (Dagnall, Parker, 198 
Munley, and Drinkwater, 2010; Dembińska-Krajewska and Rybakowski, 2014).  199 
Other O-LIFE dimensions (cognitive disorganization, impulsive nonconformity and 200 
introverted anhedonia) relate less obviously to anomalous beliefs. Indeed, cognitive 201 
disorganization (unconventional trains of thought; disorganised thinking) and impulsive 202 
nonconformity (the failure to follow social rules non-compliance with conventional or 203 
established social roles; lack of self-control) only indirectly index elements of anomalous 204 
thinking/beliefs. Accordingly, significant but weak relationships were expected.  205 
Regarding introverted anhedonia (blunted affect, antisocial behavior and lack of ability 206 
to feel pleasure; negative schizotypy), previous research evinces that negative aspects of 207 
schizotypy are not primarily involved with the development of paranormal beliefs. Instead, 208 
negative schizotypy plays a key role in the affective interpretation of subjectively perceived 209 
paranormal experiences (Irwin and Green, 1998; Schofield and Claridge, 2007). Hence, no 210 
significant association was anticipated between paranormal belief and introverted anhedonia 211 
(Irwin and Green, 1998).  212 
Consistent with Williams and Irwin (1991), the authors hypothesized that belief in the 213 
paranormal would structure cognitions and perceptions related to unusual experiences/magical 214 
ideation and consequently, increase the tendency to perceive non-causally events as related. 215 
Thus, whilst scores on high schizotypy (particularly, UnExp) correlate negatively with tasks 216 
assessing statistical bias, this relationship would be mediated by level of paranormal belief. 217 
Operationally, this manifests as decreased performance on tasks indexing perception of chance 218 
(particularly, those assessing perception of randomness). The notion that misrepresentation of 219 
chance is more strongly related to belief in the paranormal corresponds with previous research 220 
(Dagnall et al., 2014, 2016; Rogers et al., 2014) and Arnott’s (1998, 2006) taxonomy of 221 
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decision biases, which arose as a response to inadequacies within previous classification 222 
systems (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 223 
Within the taxonomy the statistical bias category, embraces chance, mistaking random 224 
events for essential process characteristics (Wagenaar, 1988) and conjunction (the 225 
overestimation of probability in compound problems; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). The 226 
statistical bias category is central to the present paper because it provides a rationale for why 227 
propensity to conjunction fallacy is less strongly associated with belief in the paranormal.  This 228 
occurs because conjunction fallacy represents a specific instance of misrepresentation of 229 
chance (Dagnall et al., 2014, 2016; Rogers, 2014). Thus, whilst misrepresentation of chance 230 
and proneness to conjunction correlate positively, conjunction contributes little unique 231 
variance.  Although, predictions concerning relationships between schizotypy, belief in the 232 
paranormal, and statistical bias arose from careful consideration of previous research, no prior 233 
work has investigated the inter-relationship between these factors. 234 
 A further consideration was the fact that previous research reports that the relationship 235 
between belief in the paranormal and statistical bias varies as a function of belief type (Dagnall 236 
et al., 2014, 2016). Poorer statistical performance is more strongly associated with Traditional 237 
Paranormal Beliefs than New Age Philosophy. These dimensions reflect the differential 238 
functioning of beliefs (individual vs. social) (Lange, Irwin and Houran, 2000). New Age 239 
Philosophy (psi, witchcraft, spiritualism and astrology) instils control over external events at 240 
the individual/personal level (Irwin, 1992), whilst Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (traditional 241 
religious beliefs, witchcraft and precognition) regulates external events at a social cultural level 242 
(Goode, 2000).  243 
Preceding studies note that these functional differences influence susceptibility to 244 
heuristic bias. Particularly, Dagnall et al. (2014) in line with previous work (Hergovich et al., 245 
2008; Wilson, 2013) observed that whilst perception of randomness correlated weakly with 246 
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both New Age Philosophy and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs, conjunction correlated only 247 
with Traditional Paranormal Beliefs. Thus, Traditional Paranormal Beliefs should more 248 
strongly relate to statistical bias than New Age Philosophy, and the effect should be stronger 249 
for misperception of randomness than proneness to conjunction.  Hence, the authors tentatively 250 
predicted that Traditional Paranormal Beliefs would have a stronger mediating effect than New 251 
Age Philosophy. 252 
 Finally, this study included paranormal problem types alongside standard problem 253 
types. These index the degree to which participants endorse paranormal explanations in 254 
preference to optimal statistical solutions. The researchers anticipated that performance on 255 
paranormal problems would correlate negatively with schizotypy.  256 
 257 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 258 
PARTICIPANTS 259 
A sample of 254 participants (69 male, 27% and 185 female, 73%) took part in the study. Mean 260 
age 26.66, SD = 9.81, range 18 to 71 years. Males, M = 28.84, SD = 10.52, range 20–65 years, 261 
and females, M = 25.84, SD = 9.43, range 18–71 years. Participant recruitment was via emails 262 
to university staff and students and local stakeholders (businesses, leisure and vocational/sports 263 
classes). The sample comprised 60% enrolled undergraduate students (59% Psychology, 30% 264 
Health Care and 11% Arts & Humanities) and 40% non-students. Prior to participation, a 265 
question asked whether participants had previously studied heuristic bias. If participants 266 
endorsed the question, participation discontinued. 267 
 268 
MEASURES 269 
Probabilistic reasoning tasks 270 
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Four problem types derived from Dagnall et al. (2007, 2014) assessed probabilistic reasoning: 271 
perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy, paranormal perception of randomness and 272 
paranormal conjunction fallacy. Items were organised into five counter-balanced sections, 273 
which contained one of each problem type. 274 
 275 
After reading each problem, participants indicated the most probable outcome from a range of 276 
alternatives. 277 
 278 
Perception of Randomness  279 
These problems evaluated participant’s ability to judge the likelihood of strings/sequences 280 
(e.g., ‘imagine a coin was tossed six times. Which pattern of results do you think is most 281 
likely?: (a) HHHHHH, (b) HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) all equally likely’). 282 
 283 
Conjunction Fallacy  284 
Participants selected the most probable outcome from presented statements. Alternatives 285 
included single and co-occurring events (e.g., ‘two football teams (Team A and Team B) are 286 
playing in a local derby. What is the most likely outcome of the game?: (a) Team A scores first, 287 
(b) Team A scores first and win, (c) Team A scores first and loses, (d) Team A scores first and 288 
the game is drawn’). 289 
 290 
Paranormal Perception of Randomness  291 
Items possessed the same underlying structure as standard perception of randomness problems. 292 
The only difference being that judgements about the likelihood of strings/sequences occurred 293 
within a paranormal context. For example, ‘A famous psychic, with renowned paranormal 294 
abilities, has successfully predicted the outcome of the last 6 annually held boat races between 295 
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two famous English Universities [University A and University B]. This year the psychic 296 
predicts University B will win. Which of the following is most likely?: (a) University A will 297 
win the event , (b) University B will win the event, (c) University A and University B are both 298 
equally as likely to win the event.  299 
 300 
Paranormal Conjunction Fallacy 301 
Similarly, paranormal conjunctions contextualised conjunctions within a paranormal setting. 302 
Problems possessed the same underlying structure as standard conjunctions; event intersection 303 
probability could not exceed single (constituent) event likelihood (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 304 
1982, 1983). For instance, ‘Andrew often sits by the telephone at work. Just as he is thinking 305 
about his friend (Elaine), she rings: (a) Elaine rang because Andrew was thinking about her 306 
[event intersection], (b) Andrew was thinking about Elaine because she was about to ring [event 307 
intersection], (c) Elaine rang [single event]’. 308 
 309 
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) 310 
The O-LIFE brief is shortened version of the original 104-item scale (Mason, Claridge, and 311 
Jackson, 1995). The O-LIFE measures schizotypal personality traits in non-clinical individuals. 312 
The O-LIFE brief contains 43 items divided into four sub-scales:  Unusual Experiences 313 
(UnExp), Cognitive Disorganisation (CogDis), Introvertive Anhedonia (IntAn) and Impulsive 314 
Nonconformity (ImpNon) (Mason, Linney, and Claridge, 2005). The Unusual Experiences 315 
scale contains 12 items phenomenologically related to the positive symptoms of psychosis and 316 
thus assesses positive schizotypy (perceptual aberrations, magical thinking and hallucinations). 317 
The Cognitive Disorganisation sub-scale comprises 11 items reflecting thought disorder and 318 
other disorganised aspects of psychosis. Particularly, items tap poor attention/concentration, 319 
poor decision-making and social anxiety. The Introvertive Anhedonia sub-scale is composed 320 
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of 10 items measuring negative schizotypy (schizoid temperament). Items assess lack of 321 
enjoyment from social and physical sources of pleasure and avoidance of intimacy. The 322 
Impulsive Nonconformity scale features 10 items generically indexing lack of self-control 323 
(impulsive, anti-social, and eccentric forms of behaviour). The O-LIFE following its 324 
development has become widely used. The scale possesses established psychometric qualities, 325 
particularly high internal consistency (Mason et al., 1995) and test–retest reliability (Burch, 326 
Steel, and Hemsley, 1998). Since inception, clinical and experimental studies have used the O-327 
LIFE, establishing its legitimacy, reliability and validity (Mason and Claridge, 2006). 328 
 329 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) (Tobacyk and Milford, 1983, Tobacyk, 1988) 330 
The RPBS is a 26-item self-report measure, which assesses belief in the paranormal. The RPBS 331 
is the most widely used measure of paranormal belief (Goulding and Parker, 2001). Questions 332 
are presented as statements (e.g., ‘There is a devil’) and respondents rate items on a seven-333 
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items measure 334 
seven facets: traditional religious beliefs, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, psi, witchcraft, 335 
precognition and superstition. The RPBS globally demonstrates satisfactory reliability; sub-336 
scale dimensionality however, is uncertain (Cardena, Palmer, and Marcusson-Clavertz, 2015). 337 
To address measurement concerns, Lange, Irwin, and Houran (2000) performed a Rasch 338 
scaling purification of the scale. This produced two psychometrically superior factors; New 339 
Age Philosophy (NAP) (11-items assesses belief in psi and survival of bodily death) and 340 
Traditional Paranormal Belief (TPB) (5-items measure belief in concepts, such as the devil, 341 
witchcraft, heaven and hell) (Cardena et al., 2015). Rasch scaling demands that responses are 342 
recoded (0-6) (Lange et al., 2000). Thus, total scores range from 0 to 156 (higher scores 343 
indicating belief in the paranormal). NAP Rasch scores range from 6.85 to 47.72 and TPB 344 
11.16 to 43.24 (Andrich, 1988). Overall, RPBS demonstrates adequate validity (Tobacyk, 345 
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2004). Both subscales demonstrate minimal item response bias (gender and age), possess 346 
predictive validity and are unidimensional. The RPBS overall, is a psychometrically 347 
satisfactory measure of belief in the paranormal (Tobacyk, 2004).  348 
 349 
The presentation order of paranormal belief and schizotypy measures was counter-balanced 350 
across participants. 351 
 352 
PROCEDURE 353 
Prior to testing ethical approval was granted as part of a research project examining the 354 
relationship between anomalous beliefs and cognitive-perceptual measures. Potential 355 
participants read an information sheet before consenting to the study. After providing informed 356 
consent, participants received the booklet containing the measures. Instructions asked 357 
participants to take their time and answer questions as openly and honestly as possible. The 358 
booklet contained four sections: personal information (always completed first), problem 359 
solving, O-LIFE and belief in the paranormal. On completion of the booklet, participants were 360 
debriefed. 361 
 362 
DATA ANALYSIS PLAN 363 
Justification and General Analytical Strategy 364 
Prior to structural equation modelling (SEM) data screening was undertaken. Then means, 365 
standard deviations and bivariate correlations for each scale were calculated. SEM 366 
characterises hypothetical constructs as latent variables, which represent interrelated measures 367 
or observed variables. Fit indices evaluate the degree to which observed data support specified 368 
theoretical models. In the context of the present study, mediation analysis was performed to 369 
determine whether level of paranormal belief explained the relationship between schizotypy 370 
I revi
ew
Towards a better understanding 16 
 
and propensity to statistical bias (misperception of randomness and conjunction error). Social 371 
science research frequently employs mediational analysis because it identifies and elucidates 372 
the process that underlies a reported relationship between observed variables. Analysis in the 373 
current study used AMOS version 22. 374 
Prior to model evaluation, confirmatory factor analysis ensured sequential estimation 375 
of measures was appropriate (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). SEM included an analysis of 376 
general mediation; this assessed the hypothesis that schizotypy had both direct and indirect 377 
effects on statistical bias. Particularly, the notion that belief in the paranormal mediated the 378 
schizotypy-statistical bias relationship. Mediation was determined by consulting bootstrapping 379 
estimates of indirect effects.  380 
SEM conventions necessitate a comparison of alternative models, when more than one 381 
a priori model is available (within the alternative model proposed mediator effects are restricted 382 
to zero). The degree to which the less restrictive model better fits the data provides an indication 383 
of the significance of the mediator. For comparison purposes, an additional alternative model 384 
was tested in which statistical bias was suggested to mediate the relationship between 385 
schizotypy and paranormal belief. Finally, consideration of partial correlations indicated 386 
whether level of schizotypy associated with endorsement of problems framed in a paranormal 387 
context.  388 
 389 
Fit Indices 390 
Several indices evaluated model fit (the maximum likelihood chi-square statistic, χ2; the Root 391 
Mean Square Error of Approximation, RMSEA; Standardised Root Mean Square Residual, 392 
SRMR; and the Comparative Fit Index, CFI) (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Traditionally, chi-square 393 
assesses absolute fit, the degree to which a priori model fits or reproduces data. Chi-square, 394 
however, is sensitive to sample size and frequently rejects structural models derived from large 395 
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samples (Kline, 2005).  Hence, RMSEA and SRMR are also typically used. RMSEA measures 396 
the difference between the population covariance matrix and the reproduced covariance matrix, 397 
in order to control for sampling variability. A strength of the RMSEA is that it has a confidence 398 
interval, which provides an indication of how precise the fit of a model is. SRMR provides the 399 
square root of the discrepancy between the model covariance matrix and the sample covariance 400 
matrix.  401 
Relative fit considers relationship between the chi-square from the proposed model with 402 
the null/baseline model (i.e., Comparative Fit Index – CFI, Cronbach, 1990). Specifically, CFI 403 
compares the chi-square of the hypothesised model with a model that assumes all relationships 404 
among measured variables are zero (independence model). CFI values above .90 indicate good 405 
fit and values above .95 specify very good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). In line with 406 
previous research (e.g., Bong, Woo, and Shin, 2013), CFI values above .88 can be considered 407 
to indicate marginal fit. An acceptable model requires RMSEA less than .10, SRMR less than 408 
.08 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993), and a CFI greater than .88 (Bong et al., 2013). For reporting 409 
RMSEA values, the 90% confidence interval (CI) was included. Furthermore, Akaike 410 
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) evaluated model fit; smaller values indicate better 411 
models. 412 
 413 
RESULTS 414 
Scale Properties and Inter-Measure Correlations 415 
The O-LIFE demonstrated good internal reliability, Cronbach’s alpha (α = .87). The Unusual 416 
Experiences (α = .76) and Cognitive Disorganisation (α = .81) subscales possessed acceptable 417 
and good internal reliability respectively. Introvertive Anhedonia (α = .66) and Impulsive 418 
Nonconformity (α = .64) fell below the frequently cited α = .70 level of acceptability. This was 419 
not problematic because .60, allowing for measurement error in psychological/social science, 420 
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represents an acceptable level (Lance, Butts, and Michels, 2006, Nunnally, 1978). Observed 421 
alpha values were consistent with those reported by Mason et al. (2005). The Revised 422 
Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) demonstrated excellent internal reliability, Cronbach’s alpha 423 
(α = .94). The New Age Philosophy (NAP) (α = .88) and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (TPB) 424 
(α = .82) subscales possessed good internal reliability (George and Mallery, 2003). Total 425 
schizotypy (O-LIFE) and all schizotypy subscales except Introvertive Anhedonia indicated 426 
significant positive correlations with paranormal beliefs. Of the schizotypy subscales, Unusual 427 
Experiences possessed the strongest correlations with paranormal beliefs (see Table 1). 428 
 429 
Table 1 Scale Descriptive Information and Inter-Scale Pearson Correlations. 430 
 431 
O-LIFE, The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; RPBS, Revised Paranormal 432 
Belief Scale; NAP, New Age Philosophy; TPB, Traditional Paranormal Belief, *p < .05, **p < .001 433 
 434 
Problem Type Descriptive Statistics  435 
Problem solution scores were calculated (perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy, 436 
paranormal perception of randomness, paranormal conjunction fallacy, overall standard, and 437 
overall paranormal). These are presented as means and proportions alongside inter-problem 438 
correlations in Table 2. Pearson product moment revealed positive correlations between 439 
problem types. 440 
 441 
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Table 2 Problem Task Descriptive Information and Inter-Item Pearson Correlations. 442 
 443 
*p < .05, **p < .001 444 
 445 
Belief in the Paranormal, Schizotypy and Problem Task Solution 446 
A further set of Pearson product moment correlations found negative associations between 447 
belief in the paranormal and schizotypy and problem types (see Table 3), particularly Unusual 448 
Experiences and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs. 449 
 450 
Table 3 Pearson Correlations between Problem Solving Task Performance, Schizotypy 451 
and Belief in the Paranormal. 452 
 453 
O-LIFE, The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; UE, Unusual Experiences; CD, 454 
Cognitive Disorganisation; IA, Introverted Anhedonia, IN, Impulsive Nonconformity, RPBS, Revised 455 
Paranormal Belief Scale; NAP, New Age Philosophy; TPB, Traditional Paranormal Belief, *p < .05, 456 
**p < .001 457 
 458 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 459 
Examination of inter variable zero-order correlations revealed that belief in the paranormal was 460 
most strongly associated with the Unusual Experiences (UnExp) factor of schizotypy. Hence, 461 
corresponding with predictions, subsequent SEM analyses focused on UnExp. Following 462 
confirmatory factor analyses, SEM assessed the hypothesis that UnExp had both direct and 463 
indirect effects on statistical bias. Mediation was determined by consulting bootstrapping 464 
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estimates of indirect effects and assessed two models: model 1 examined the role of TPB, and 465 
model 2 considered the role of NAP. As outlined in the introduction, previous research reports 466 
that proneness to statistical bias varies as a function of belief type. Specifically, TPB correlates 467 
more strongly with general propensity to statistical bias than NAP.  468 
 469 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) 470 
Analysis involved theoretically driven CFA on each selected scale (UnExp, RPBS standard 471 
problem types, and problems couched within a paranormal context).  The UnExp subscale, 472 
according to research, represents a single factor.  The model based on supporting research for 473 
the RPBS was a two-factor correlated model consisting of Traditional Paranormal New Age 474 
and Philosophy Beliefs factors.  Models for standard problem types and paranormal problems 475 
were also two-factor correlated models.   476 
The single factor model for unusual experiences (UnExp) reported a significant chi-477 
square and unsatisfactory model fit for CFI, marginal fit for RMSEA and SRMR: χ2 (54, N = 478 
254) = 157.07, p < .001; CFI = .79; RMSEA = .08 (CI of .07 to .10); SRMR = .07.  Further 479 
inspection revealed poor factor loadings on the unusual experiences subscale of item 1 and 480 
item 9 (.25 and .22 respectively) and so were dropped from the CFA, resulting in a good overall 481 
model fit: χ2 (31, N = 254) = 58.91, p < .05; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .06 (CI of .04 to .08); SRMR 482 
= .05. Comparison of AIC values supported the superior fit of the factor model following 483 
removal of items 1 and 9. The AIC value for the original model was higher (229.07 and 126.91 484 
respectively). For the two-factor model for the RPBS, results showed that although the chi-485 
square was significant, χ2 (99, N = 254) = 345.29, p < .001, the fit indices met the criteria for a 486 
marginal fit: CFI = .88; RMSEA = .10 (CI of .96 to .12); SRMR = .07.   487 
The two-factor correlated model for standard problems reported a non-significant chi-488 
square and the fit indices met the criteria for a good fit: χ2 (34, N = 254) = 47.83, p > .05; CFI 489 
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= .92; RMSEA = .04 (CI of .01 to .07); SRMR = .05. However, scale scrutiny revealed a poor 490 
factor loading for problem 16 (.12). Removing this item from the model resulted in a more 491 
parsimonious solution: χ2 (26, N = 254) = 36.51, p > .05; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .04 (CI of .01 492 
to .07); SRMR = .05. Comparison of the AIC values supported the superior fit of the factor 493 
model with item 16 removed, as the AIC value of the original model is higher than for the 494 
model with item 16 removed (109.84 and 92.52 respectively). Finally, the two-factor correlated 495 
model for problems in a paranormal context indicated a significant chi-square, χ2 (33, N = 254) 496 
= 95.63, p < .001, yet all other fit indices met the criteria for acceptable fit: CFI = .90; RMSEA 497 
= .08 (CI of .06 to .11); SRMR = .05.   498 
Overall, results suggest that the theoretically driven two-factor correlated models 499 
satisfactorily represent paranormal beliefs, standard problems and problems in a paranormal 500 
context; and that a single factor adequately explains unusual experiences (UnExp). 501 
The adequacy of the factor solutions can be also determined in relation to parameter 502 
estimates. All factor loadings were positive and statistically significant, all items possessed 503 
factor loadings greater than the minimum threshold of .32 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  504 
Compliant with the strict factor loading requirements of Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 505 
(1998) the majority of indicators exhibited factor loadings above .60. 506 
 507 
Composite Reliability  508 
Latent modelling cautions that traditional measures of internal reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s α) 509 
over or underestimate scale reliability (Raykov, 2002). Hence, composite reliability provides a 510 
more rigorous assessment of internal reliability. When considering composite reliability, values 511 
greater than .60 are acceptable (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000).  Results for the standard 512 
problems indicated that perception of randomness (PR) (ρc = .62) and conjunction fallacy (CF) 513 
(ρc = .60) possessed satisfactory composite reliability. Problems framed in a paranormal 514 
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context, PPR and PCF indicated satisfactory composite reliability (ρc =.80 and ρc = .65 515 
respectively), as did UnExp (ρc =.75). Finally, TPB and NAP, demonstrated also satisfactory 516 
composite reliability (ρc =.78 and ρc = .88 respectively). 517 
 518 
Model Test: Schizotypy, Paranormal Belief and Standard Problem Types 519 
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs 520 
The mediation model in which traditional paranormal beliefs (TPB) subscale had both direct 521 
and indirect effects on statistical bias (standard problem types of conjunction fallacy vs. 522 
perception of randomness) (Figure 1) was statistically significant, χ2 (239, N = 254) = 371.92 523 
p < .001. Fit indices indicated an acceptable data-model fit: CFI = .90; RMSEA = .04 (CI of 524 
.03 to .05); SRMR = .07. Inspection of the structural path from UnExp to TPB revealed a 525 
significant positive effect of UnExp on TPB (β = .31, p < .001).  Furthermore, TPB had a 526 
significant negative effect on both perception of randomness (β = -.39, p < .001) and 527 
conjunction fallacy (β = -.25, p < .05). UnExp and TPB accounted for 19% of the variance in 528 
perception of randomness, and accounted for 9% of the variance in conjunction fallacy. To 529 
formally test whether TPB acted as a mediator, a model was specified where the paths from 530 
TPB to UnExp and standard beliefs were constrained to zero. In this model, fit indices indicated 531 
an unacceptable model fit on all criteria, but RMSEA, χ2 (242, N = 254) = 418.58, p < .001, 532 
CFI = .87, RMSEA = .05 (CI of .04 to .06), SRMR = .11. Referring to the AIC statistic for the 533 
mediation model vs. the constrained model for TPB, the mediation model demonstrated 534 
superior fit, as the AIC is 541.93, which is lower than the constrained model (AIC = 582.59). 535 
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 536 
Fig. 1 Model 1 – Mediation model depicting the relationship between unusual experiences and standard 537 
problem types, as mediated by traditional paranormal belief.  Latent variables are represented by 538 
ellipses, measured variables are represented by squares, and e indicates error of measurement. Lines 539 
between latent variables indicate standardized coefficients; *p < .05, **p < .001 540 
The constrained model indicated a significant negative path between UnExp and PR (β 541 
= -.23, p < .05), but not between UnExp and CF (β = -.13, p > .05).  In the final model, however, 542 
the path from UnExp to PR was non-significant (β = -.10, p > .05). Bootstrapping estimates 543 
indicated that UnExp had a lower-bounds indirect effect on PR of -.25 and upper-bounds 544 
indirect effect of -.07 with p < .01. This indicated that UnExp had a significant indirect effect 545 
on PR. The absence of a significant path between UnExp and CF once TPB was constrained to 546 
zero suggests UnExp did not significantly influence CF through TPB. These latter findings 547 
suggest that TPB mediated the effect of UnExp on PR, but not CF.  548 
An alternative model was tested in which statistical bias (CF and PR) was proposed to 549 
mediate the relationship between UnExp and TPB. Paths between TPB and statistical bias were 550 
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reversed in this model. Fit indices remained the same, given only direction was adjusted. 551 
However, inspection of the paths suggested statistical bias did not fully mediate the relationship 552 
between UnExp and TPB, as the path between TPB and UE remained significant (β =.20, p < 553 
.05) with the inclusion of statistical bias to this relationship. 554 
 555 
New Age Philosophy 556 
The mediation model in which New Age Philosophy (NAP) had both direct and indirect effects 557 
on statistical bias (conjunction fallacy vs. perception of randomness) (Figure 2) was statistically 558 
significant, χ2 (392, N = 254) = 631.08, p < .001. Further, consideration of fit indices revealed 559 
an acceptable data-model fit: CFI = .89; RMSEA = .05 (CI of .04 to .06); SRMR = .07. 560 
Examination of the structural path from UnExp to NAP revealed NAP had a significant positive 561 
effect (β = .31, p < .001), and a significant negative effect on perception of randomness (β = -562 
.31, p < .001) but not on conjunction fallacy (β = -.17, p > .05). UnExp and NAP accounted for 563 
15% of the variance in PR, and explained 6% of the variance in CF.   564 I  revi
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 565 
Fig. 2 Model 2 – Mediation model depicting the relationship between unusual experiences and standard 566 
problem types, as mediated by new age philosophy.  Latent variables are represented by ellipses, 567 
measured variables are represented by squares, and e indicates error of measurement. Lines between 568 
latent variables indicate standardized coefficients; *p < .05, **p < .001 569 
 570 
To test formally the mediating role of NAP, the model specified paths from NAP to 571 
UnExp and statistical bias were constrained to zero. In this model, fit indices indicated an 572 
unacceptable model fit on all criteria, but RMSEA, χ2 (395, N=254) = 666.33, p < .001, CFI = 573 
.88, RMSEA = .05 (CI of .04 to .06), SRMR = .10. Referring to the AIC statistic for the 574 
mediation model vs. the constrained model for NAP, the mediation model demonstrated 575 
superior fit, as the AIC is 837.08, which is lower than the constrained model (AIC = 866.33). 576 
The constrained model indicated that UnExp had a significant negative effect on PR (β = -.23, 577 
p < .05), but not on CF (β = -.18, p > .05). In the final model, however, the path from UnExp 578 
to both PR and CF was non-significant (β = -.14, p > .05; and β = -.13, p > .05 respectively). 579 
Bootstrapping estimates indicated that UnExp possessed a lower-bounds indirect effect on PR 580 
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of -.16 and upper-bounds indirect effect of -.03 with p < 0.05. This indicated that UnExp had 581 
a significant indirect effect on PR, and hence NAP mediated the effect of UnExp on perception 582 
of randomness. As with model 1, the absence of a significant path between UnExp and CF after 583 
constraining NAP to zero suggested that UnExp did not significantly influence CF through 584 
NAP.  585 
As with Model 1, an alternative model was tested in which statistical bias (CF and PR) 586 
was proposed to mediate the relationship between UnExp and NAP. Paths between NAP and 587 
statistical bias were reversed and fit indices remained the same, given only direction was 588 
adjusted. Inspection of the paths suggested statistical bias did not fully mediate the relationship 589 
between UnExp and NAP, as the path between NAP and UE remained significant (β =.22, p < 590 
.05) with the inclusion of statistical bias to this relationship. 591 
 592 
Schizotypy and Paranormal Problem Types 593 
Analysis of paranormal problems omitted belief in the paranormal due to methodological 594 
concerns (see Dagnall et al., 2016). Correlating paranormal problems with belief in the 595 
paranormal is problematic because it potentially conflates belief and bias. Specifically, problem 596 
similarity (shared paranormal context), increases the positive correlation between problem 597 
types and reduces bias discriminatory power. Hence, partial correlation identified unique 598 
variance between unusual experiences (schizotypy) and paranormal problem types.   599 
The relationship between paranormal perception of randomness and unusual 600 
experiences (controlling for paranormal conjunction fallacy) was not significant, r = -.01, df = 601 
251, p > .05. However, a significant positive correlation was observed between for paranormal 602 
conjunction fallacy and unusual experiences (controlling for paranormal perception of 603 
randomness), r = -.28, df = 251, p < .001. 604 
 605 
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Conclusion 606 
Paranormal belief factors (traditional paranormal belief and new age philosophy) mediated the 607 
relationship between UnExp and perception of randomness, but not between UnExp and 608 
conjunction fallacy. Traditional Paranormal Belief demonstrated stronger relationships than 609 
New Age Philosophy with both UnExp and standard problems. Context influenced the 610 
relationship between UnExp and statistical bias. Conjunction problems presented in a 611 
paranormal context (controlling for perception of randomness) positively correlated with 612 
UnExp. Whilst no association between perception of randomness and UnExp (controlling for 613 
conjunction) was observed. 614 
 615 
DISCUSSION 616 
As hypothesized, the O-LIFE Unusual Experiences subscale (UnExp) was most strongly 617 
associated with belief in the paranormal. UnExp moderately positively correlated with 618 
paranormal measures (overall paranormal belief; Traditional Paranormal Belief, TPB; and New 619 
Age Philosophy, NAP). This finding supported previous work delineating a relationship 620 
between positive schizotypy (proneness to experiencing strange perceptual-cognitive 621 
sensations and magical interpretations) and belief in the paranormal (Hergovich et al., 2008; 622 
Dagnall et al., 2010; Dembińska-Krajewska and Rybakowski, 2014).  623 
 Whilst UnExp and belief in the paranormal correlated negatively with performance on 624 
problem tasks, consideration of zero-order correlations revealed that belief in the paranormal, 625 
particularly TPB, was more strongly associated with proneness to statistical bias. As expected, 626 
TPB correlated with both perception of randomness and conjunction fallacy, whilst NAP was 627 
associated only with perception of randomness. Results aligned with previous work, which 628 
reported a stronger relationship between TPB (vs. NAP) and susceptibility to heuristic bias 629 
(Wilson, 2013; Dagnall et al., 2014). Overall, findings concurred with the notion that 630 
In revi
ew
Towards a better understanding 28 
 
conjunction bias (in this context) represents a specific instance of misrepresentation of chance 631 
(Arnott, 1998, 2006; Rogers, 2014; Dagnall et al., 2016). 632 
Paranormal belief factors mediated the relationship between UnExp and perception of 633 
randomness, but not UnExp and conjunction fallacy. TPB (vs. NAP) demonstrated stronger 634 
relationships with UnExp and standard problems. Particularly, correlations between TPB, 635 
UnExp and perception of randomness (compared to conjunction) reflected this. Alternative 636 
models (one a constrained model and the other with statistical bias conceptualised as a 637 
mediator) were weaker in comparison with the hypothesised model. This provided support for 638 
the role of paranormal belief as a mediator. 639 
The presence of mediation supports the postulation that belief in the paranormal acts as 640 
a framework for shaping schizotypal related cognitions (odd beliefs and/or magical thinking) 641 
(Williams and Irwin, 1991). This interpretation aligns with the notion of a paranormal 642 
worldview (Zusne and Jones, 1982). This is a broad perspective that references events to 643 
intangible mental and metaphysical processes, rather than observable/physical factors. From 644 
this viewpoint, belief in the paranormal represents a coherent, internally logical set of 645 
explanations for unusual phenomenon. Within the worldview, proneness to statistical bias is 646 
largely attributable to a subjective preferential thinking style, rather than a defective 647 
understanding of probability. 648 
The finding that mediation occurred for misrepresentation of chance and not 649 
conjunction is with hindsight predictable because proneness to conjunction (vs. perception of 650 
randomness) relates less strongly to belief in the paranormal (Dagnall et al., 2014, 2016). 651 
Indirectly, this finding provides further support for the notion that conjunction (in this context) 652 
represents a specific instance of misrepresentation of chance (Arnott, 1998, 2006; Rogers, 653 
2014). Conjunction indexes less unique variance (as evidenced by weaker effect sizes and 654 
inconsistently reported findings). Misperception of randomness accounted for the majority of 655 
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variance within the UnExp-statistical bias relationship. This was similar to the previously 656 
delineated model for belief in the paranormal, however, the relationship between UnExp and 657 
statistical bias was weaker (approximately 7% vs 3% variance).  658 
 Within this study, a framing effect occurred; problems couched within a paranormal 659 
context proved easier to solve (standard: perception of randomness 75% and conjunction 39% 660 
vs paranormal: perception of randomness 86% and conjunction 88%). This finding was 661 
commensurate with previous studies (see; Rogers et al, 2009, 2011; Dagnall et al., 2016). 662 
Placing problems in a paranormal context reduces their discriminatory power because framing 663 
conflates belief in the paranormal with statistical bias. Thus, it becomes unclear whether 664 
believers endorse incorrect solutions because of their level of belief or their susceptibility to 665 
statistical error. Accordingly, whilst problems in a paranormal context are easier to solve, this 666 
advantage reduces as a function of belief in the paranormal. Indeed, performance on 667 
conjunction tasks increased markedly when the problems were located within a paranormal 668 
setting (vs. everyday situation).  669 
Framing strengthened the association between UnExp and conjunction fallacy. This 670 
may occur because paranormal settings make conjunctions (event co-occurrence) particularly 671 
appealing to individuals scoring high on UnExp. Problem structure may suggest/infer a direct 672 
causal relationship between constituent elements. A recent paper by Rogers et al. (2016) 673 
supports this notion. They found that believers in the paranormal were prone to endorsing 674 
conjunctions when a succeeding event confirmed (provided evidence for) the first. For 675 
individuals high in UnExp, the paranormal context supports ideations related to magical 676 
thinking, unusual beliefs and odd associations. Clearly, this does not apply in the context of 677 
paranormal perception of randomness problems, where participants merely estimate the 678 
probability of an event/outcome. This suggests that context may affect conjunction 679 
susceptibility, whilst perception of randomness is relatively domain general.  680 
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Clearly, more work is required in this area. Generally, assessing the degree to which 681 
susceptibility to statistical bias varies as a function of context and belief type. Whilst, belief in 682 
the paranormal is associated with misperception of randomness, other anomalous beliefs 683 
appear more strongly related to proneness to conjunction. Notably, Brotherton and French 684 
(2014) found that participants who more strongly (vs. weak) endorsed conspiracy theories 685 
made more conjunction errors.  686 
These recent examples suggest that belief type/structure qualifies proneness to 687 
statistical bias. In the case of conspiracies, perceived co-occurrence of events is more important 688 
than estimation of probability. By their nature, conspiracies are unlikely to be true (Grimes, 689 
2016). Support for conspiracies occurs, when perceived inadequacies in prevailing 690 
explanations (A) result in the endorsement of an alternative account (B) (B is dependent on A). 691 
This parallels the underlying structure of conjunction error; in order for B to be true A must be 692 
false. For example, conspiracists view inaccuracies within the official Roswell, 1947 as 693 
evidence that an alien spacecraft crashed (Nickell, 2009; Thomas, 1995). 694 
Before concluding, the authors acknowledge that the mediation model used in this paper 695 
was cross-sectional. Therefore, findings provide only correlational evidence. Furthermore, 696 
scholars report that cross-sectional data sometimes provide biased estimates (Maxwell and 697 
Cole, 2007). It is thus important for future research to carry out longitudinal assessments to 698 
demonstrate fully a causal relationship from schizotypy to statistical bias through paranormal 699 
belief. In relation to this limitation, it is noteworthy that there are theoretical arguments 700 
supporting the more primitive status of schizotypal traits over paranormal beliefs. In particular, 701 
schizotypy is a trait-like construct with a notable genetic component (see for example Ericson, 702 
Tuvblad, Raine, Young-Wolff, and Baker, 2011), and schizotypal traits (including UnExp) are 703 
less malleable than paranormal beliefs. In addition, paranormal beliefs act as an interpretive 704 
framework, which offer structure to schizotypal traits such as UnExp (Williams and Irwin, 705 
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1991). From this perspective, it is logical that schizotypal traits influence statistical bias 706 
through paranormal beliefs. Weaker observed effects within the alternative model, where 707 
statistical bias was conceptualised as a mediator, provided further support for the direction of 708 
the hypothesised relationships. Accordingly, the interpretation of the current mediation models 709 
is more theoretically plausible than alternatives, which posit schizotypy or statistical bias as 710 
mediators. 711 
There are factors, which potentially limit the generalisability of this paper’s findings. 712 
These include failure to employ exclusion criteria, educational level and participant gender. 713 
With regard to exclusion criteria, paper reviewers identified variables that potentially could 714 
influence or confound results (i.e., psychiatric morbidity, substance misuse and exposure to 715 
religion). Other similar work has not identified these factors as problematic or employed 716 
exclusion criteria (Hergovich et al., 2008; Darwin, Neave and Holmes, 2011). Consistent with 717 
this approach, which is typical to working with general adult populations, the authors assumed 718 
that routine data screening would eliminate extreme outlying data points; control for potentially 719 
confounding scores. With regard to consideration of level of education (academic 720 
qualifications), no direct measure was necessary. Preceding work reports that statistical bias 721 
proneness is a robust phenomenon, largely unaffected by educational variables, such as level 722 
of statistical awareness (Fisk, 2004; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Moreover, level of 723 
education provides only an indirect index of general cognitive ability (McClelland, 1973). 724 
Finally, there was no consideration of gender differences; prior research within the area of 725 
paranormal belief and statistical bias has failed to either test or report gender differences. Future 726 
work may wish to explore whether these factors influence relationships between belief in the 727 
paranormal, schizotypy and statistical bias. 728 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that potential for sample bias exists within 729 
paranormal-related studies. Particularly, individuals interested in the paranormal are more 730 
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inclined to participate in associated research because of the inherent appeal of the subject 731 
matter. Subsequently, samples may under represent non-believers scoring high on schizotypy. 732 
Accordingly, paranormal believers’ tendency to self-select may produce an overestimation of 733 
the relationship between belief and schizotypy. For this reason, caution is required when 734 
interpreting results. 735 
 736 
CONCLUSION 737 
Within clinical groups, there is a well-established relationship between psychosis, cognitive 738 
bias and jumping to conclusions (Hassanali, et al., 2015). Collectively, evidence suggests that 739 
reasoning abnormalities may correlate positively with the formation of unusual beliefs 740 
(Lawrence and Peters, 2004). Within the present study, relationships between schizotypy and 741 
proneness to statistical bias were weak.  Indeed, as proposed by Williams and Irwin (1991), 742 
belief in the paranormal played an important mediating effect. Paranormal belief provided a 743 
framework for interpreting cognitive-perceptual factors of schizotypy, which resulted in 744 
increased susceptibility to misperception of randomness (schizotypy influenced statistical bias 745 
through paranormal belief). 746 
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